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NOISE AND THE LAW
George A. Spater*
I.

ABOUT SOME ANCIENT NOISES AND SOME MODERN NOISES

before the beginning of modem science, men were making
sounds that were disagreeable to their neighbors. Many of these
were the natural noises of people and their domestic animals but
a surprisingly large number were the noises of industry. One of the
adventures of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza begins with the
"terrible din" of a fulling mill. The fourteenth century Sir Gawain
and The Green Knight speaks of the "wondrous loud noise" of a
grind stone. The streets of the medieval town resounded with the
"beating out of iron upon a blacksmith's anvil, hammering of carpenters, pounding on sheet copper from a kettle maker's." A poem
written about 1350 complains that blacksmiths "Drive me to death
with the din of their dints"; because of them "No man ... can get a
night's rest." And four hundred years later in what we think of as the
peaceful colonial city of Philadelphia, Ben Franklin felt compelled
to move from High Street to Second and Sassafras because "the din
of the Market increases upon me; and that, with frequent interruptions, has, I find, made me say some things twice over." 1
These random selections illustrate that noise, far from being an
invention of the modem world, has been a problem as long as men
have been living together in towns. For this reason the law began to
concern itself very early with the types of annoyance characteristic of
communal living. These annoyances were not limited to noise, but
encompassed the entire range of activities resulting from the use of
one's own property in a way that may adversely affect the use of a
neighbor's property-smoke, smells, soot, bright lights, vibration,
flooding, water pollution and explosive blasts, as well as noise.2
The peculiar contribution of modem science has been to add
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• Member of the New York Bar.-Ed.
I am indebted to Richard A. Lempert, Esq., of New York City for the collection of
railway and highway cases that appears in notes 110 and 111 and to A.C.L. Smith, Esq.,
of London, England, for assistance in compiling the information on English law contained in Part IV, infra.
1. CERVANTES, THE INGENIOUS GENTLEMAN DoN QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA ch. XX
(Putnam ed. 1949); MEDIEVAL ROMANCES 380 (Loomis ed. 1957); HUNT, FIFTEENTH
CENTUR.Y ENGLAND 26 (1962); CHAUCER'S WORLD 16-17 (Rickert ed. 1962); BRIDENBAUGH,
CITIES IN REVOLT 24 (1964).
2. "There is, I apprehend, no distinction between any of the cases, whether it be
smoke, smell, noise, vapour, or water, or any other gas or fluid." Lord Romilly in
Crump v. Lambert, L.R. 3 Eq. 409, 413 (1867).
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some new types of noise-makers. While the source of the annoyance
is different, the impact of these noises on neighbors is not new. Airplanes, trucks and outboard motor boats can drown out voices and
interrupt sleep. The sonic boom of low flying supersonic aircraft can
break windows. Experiments are currently being conducted with
noises that kill small animals and would presumably kill humans.
While the addition of any new noises to an already noisy world is
upsetting, legal principles already exist, and have long existed, which
deal with interferences that drown out voices or interrupt sleep, that
break windows and that kill animals and humans. As has so often
been the case in the history of the law, the story of noise and the law
is not one of the development of new principles to fit new noises, but
the application of established principles to solve old problems arising
in somewhat different forms. 3

II.

.ABOUT SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NOISE

For practical purposes the discussion of the law of noise can be
considered in two parts: first, the rights of a complainant against a
private person and second, the rights of a complainant against the
government or an agency acting by government authority.
Whether the noise-maker is a private person or the government,
it is important to recognize that noise is more difficult to deal with
than many nuisances because at certain levels, at least, it is largely
subjective.4' Noise, by definition, is sound that is not wanted by those
who hear it.I• A Mozart divertimento when played on my phonograph
may be a noise to you as transmitted through our adjoining walls.
Even if it were not distorted in the transmission, you might not like
Mozart or you might not like it at the particular time I have chosen
to play it. This would make it noise to you. Also, some sounds are
3. See Judge Friendly, Book Review, 77 HARV. L. REv. 582, 583 (1964): "[I]n the
main, 'air law' is simply the application of general legal principles and skills to a new
industry made possible by technological advance-the equivalent for lawyers of our
century of what the railroad, the telephone, and the telegraph demanded of our nineteenth century forebears."
4. Certain noises, however, can do visible physical damage, the best known being the
ability even at relatively low volumes to break glass-a characteristic that has been
recognized for more than a thousand years. SCHOLES, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO Music
6, 14 (8th ed. 1950).
5. HANDBOOK OF NoISE CONTROL I-II (Harris ed. 1957). Sound is caused by the
exertion of energy (a hand clap for example, or a bow pulled across the strings of a
violin) transmitted by pressure waves from the source of the energy to the receiver.
In some instances the pressure waves may be inaudible-they may be too weak or,
because of their frequency, may be beyond the capacity of the human ear to receive.
When audible, these pressure waves are "sound" and when the sound is unwanted
by the receiver, it is "noise."
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more objectionable than others. People who work comfortably within
the hum of an air conditioner might be most uncomfortable if they
were subjected to a high frequency noise of the same intensity, say
the scratch of a fingernail on a blackboard. Noises that have frightening connotations are more annoying than those with pleasant connotations. 6 And a high level of tolerance can be developed to noises
that have become familiar; the city dweller temporarily in the country may find his sleep interrupted by barnyard noises while the rural
resident often may experience difficulty sleeping in the city because
of the unfamiliar sounds of urban activity. All of these have been
factors which have shaped the law pertaining to this subject.

III.

ABOUT NOISES MADE BY PRIVATE PERSONS7

For hundreds of years, indeed throughout most of the history of
the common law as we know it, courts have been struggling to reconcile the conflicting interests of two property owners--one who
believes that his ownership entitles him to use his property as he wills
and the neighbor who believes that his ownership entitles him to
enjoy his property without annoyance. 8 It is obvious that out of such
conflict, in which both sides are relying on their "absolute" property
rights, no easily applied set of rules could be established. Courts have
attempted to do justice, case by case, but two major principles, it
would appear from the Restatement of the Law of Torts, have
evolved:
First, each person must put up with a certain amount of
annoyance, inconvenience and interference.0
Second, in determining the amount of annoyance, inconvenience and interference that must be tolerated, the gravity of
the harm to the complainant should be weighed against the
utility of the conduct of his troublesome neighbor. 10
·
The first of these principles tells us what every city dweller experiences every day of his life. It is not possible to live together without
6. "[P]ublic tolerance • • • depends greatly on the hazards that people- associate
with a noise." Dr. Paul S. Veneklasen, acoustical consultant, in Hearings on Aircraft

Noise Problems Before the Subcommittees of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th &: 87th Cong., 590 (1962).
7. An asterisk following the name of a case in Parts III and IV indicates that
noise has not been a factual element in the case, but the rationale has been thought
applicable to the point for which it is cited.
8. See generally CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINsr TORTS 55 (1924); 2
POLLACK &: MAITLAND, THE HisrORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 53 (2d ed. 1911); 4 R.EsrATE·
MENT, TORTS 218-19 (1939).
_
9. See 4 R.EsrATEMENT, TORTS § 822, comment on clause (d) (1939).
10. See id., § 826. See also 1 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS 73 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 88
(lld ed. 1964).
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putting up with annoyances created by the activities of those living
near us. In some areas, such as those devoted largely to industry, we
must expect more annoyances than in others.
The second principle, the gravity-utility rule, is less easy to understand. This is because the word "utility" is used in the Restatement
in a broad and, it seems to me, somewhat awkward sense. Another
rule is required in the Restatement to make it plain that in determining the "utility" of the defendant's conduct one must consider,
in addition to the social value of his conduct, its suitability to the
locality and the "impracticability of preventing or avoiding" the
annoyance. 11
Even with this explanation, the gravity-utility rule is confusing
to one who is not an expert in the field. A simpler introduction to the
cases, although possibly not as complete an explanation, is that courts
are primarily concerned, on the one hand, with the harm that is being
caused to the plaintiff by the annoyance, and on the other hand, with
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct and the harm that
would be caused to the defendant (and sometimes to the public) if the
defendant were forced to discontinue the activity that produces the
annoyance. When an injunction is sought, the opposing elements on
the scale are weighed against each other. 12 When damages are sought
and proved, the question is largely whether the defendant's conduct
is reasonable. 13
What circumstances, then, will justify the award of damages or the
issuance of an injunction for noise made by a private person?
A.

The Award of Damages

In the typical case, the plaintiff can recover damages when the
defendant's noise causes a decrease in the value of plaintiff's property.14 It is frequently said that damages can also be recovered for
injury to plaintiff's person or to that of members of his household,
11. See 4 REsl'ATEMENT, TORTS § 828 and comment on clause (c) (1939).
12. "The relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if injunction is
granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied, is one of the factors to be considered in
determining the appropriateness of an injunction against tort." Id. § 941. See Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co.,• 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933). But cf. Vowinckel v. N.
Clark&: Sons,• 216 Cal. 156, 13 P .2d 733 (1932).
13. In determining whether noise is a nuisance "the character, volume, time, place
and duration of its occurrence, as well as the locality, must be taken into consideration."
Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 567, 569 (1934). This article contains
an interesting collection of cases dealing with specific types of noises such as bells,
barking dogs, music, etc.
14:. See, e.g., Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wis. 541, 37 N,W,2d 74
(1949) (low flights from private airport).
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but as a practical matter recovery for personal injury is rare and the
amounts of recovery are usually small, possibly because of the
extreme difficulty of proving injury from noise. 16
No damages can be recovered for a noise that constitutes a mere
annoyance. 16 All of us must accept the normal noises of communal
living. 17 The standard is not determined by the individual idiosyncracies of the plaintiff, but by what a person of "ordinary sensibilities"
can tolerate. 18 And one who purchases property or builds in an area
devoted to noisy activity cannot recover damages for noise of the character that could be reasonably anticipated in the area. 19 "No one can
move into a quarter given over to foundries and boiler shops and
demand the quiet of a farm." 20 One who buys into such an area takes
his property subject to a sort of easement.21

B.

The Issuance of an Injunction 22

Courts are reluctant to grant an injunction when to do so would
cripple a business that is being properly conducted.23 For this reason,
15. "The action for private nuisance ..• is properly an action for the invasion of
a person's interest in ..• land," but sometimes recovery for personal injury is allowed
in an action for private nuisance. 4 REsTATEMENT, TORTS 219-20 (1939), and § 827,
comment on clause (b). One of the rare cases in which more than nominal damages
have been recovered for personal discomfort due to noise is Dixon v. New York Trap
Rock Co., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944), involving the continuous blasting at
a quarry where there was a recovery of $2,000 for drugs, medical bills and demonstrable
decline in health, in addition to recovery for damage to property. In Walker v. ·wearb,
6 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the award was $12 for medicine and 6¢ for nominal
damages. But see, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1003
(1965), "many courts .•. have awarded substantial sums for •.. the personal discomforts caused by noise ... ," citing no cases.
16. Liability in damages for nuisance "begins only when the interference causes
substantial harm." PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 10, § 88.
17. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS§ 822, comment on clause (d) (1939).
18. See, e.g., Gunther v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25, 32 (N.D.
W.Va. 1957), appeal dismissed, 255 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1958).
19. "If my neighbor makes a tan-yard, so as to annoy and render less salubrious
the air of my house or garden, the law will furnish me with a remedy; but if he is
first in possession of the air, and I fix my habitation near him, the nuisance is of my
own seeking, and may continue." 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •402. "He who dislikes
the noise of traffic must not set up his abode in the heart of a great city." SALMOND,
TORTS 182 (12th ed. 1957). But see Campbell v. Seaman," 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (1876)
(noxious gases); Laflin-Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 131 Ill. 322, 23 N.E. 389 (1890)
(exploding powder magazine).
20. Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 488, 104 N.E. 371, 373 (1914).
See also Irby v. Panama Ice Co., 184 La. 1082, 168 So. 306 (1936); Grzelka v. Chevrolet
Motor Car Co., 286 Mich. 141, 281 N.W. 568 (1938); Eller v. Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51,
67 N.E. 89 (1903).
21. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 74 (1956).
22. At one time it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish his right at law before
he could obtain an injunction against a nuisance. See AMES, CASES IN EQUITY JURISDICTION
553-60 (1904); Lewis, Injunctions Against Nuisances and the Rule Requiring the Plain-
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the alert plaintiff will commence his action before the facility which
threatens to be a nuisance is constructed and before the defendant has irretrievably laid out a substantial expenditure. 2i If the
plaintiff is unwilling to seek injunctive relief at this stage, he would
nevertheless be well advised to warn the defendant in writing that
the incipient nuisance will not be tolerated and to endeavor to get
some advance assurances. 25
Once a business is under way, a noise that causes a substantial
decrease in the value of the plaintiff's property or a material discomfort to plaintiff will be enjoined:
(a) if the annoyance is due to poor design or improper operation of defendant's facility and can be abated by the adoption
of an improved design or operation,26 but the improvement must
be one that is commercially feasible, 27 or
(b) if the activity creating the noise was established in a
neighborhood obviously inappropriate for the activity. 28
tiff To Establish His Right at Law, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 289 (1908). A useful general discussion on injunctive relief against noise appears in Note, 25 VA. L. REv. 465 (1939).
A California statute denies the right to an injunction for private nuisances created
by certain business activities in areas zoned for those activities. CAL. Crv. PROC. Con:&
§ 731a.
23. See, e.g., De Blois v. Bowers,• 44 F.2d 621, 623-24 (D. Mass. 1930); McCarthy v.
Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 Fed. 927, 940 (9th Cir. 1908):
Pawlowicz v. American Locomotive Co., 90 Misc. 450, 154 N.Y.S. 768 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
24. "If the plaintiff had filed his bill before the mill was built, the balance of
convenience would have been different, and we should not have hesitated to stop what
as yet remained only a project." Judge L. Hand in Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d
736, 738 (2d Cir. 1927). See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Roberts, 62 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1933);
Herbert v. Rainey, 54 Fed. 248 (W.D. Pa. 1892). See also New York v. Pine,• 185 U.S.
93, 99 (1902). But cf. Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner,• 281 F.2d 465 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960) (refusal to enjoin anticipatory nuisance).
25. In Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1932), where
the plaintiffs had given prior notice that the intended use of the land "would destroy
their property for residential purposes," the court rejected cases cited by defendant
against the issuance of an injunction because "in many of them there was not a
precedent or concurrent notice." See also Smith v. Staso Milling Co., supra note 24,
at 738; Kroeker v. Westmoreland Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 145, 117 Atl. 669 (1922).
26. Courts will usually require the defendant to do whatever is reasonably necessary
to minimize the annoyance, including modifications to bring the defendant's plant or
mode of operations up to the latest developments for the control of the annoyance
complained of. Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 246 Pac. 319 (1926). Private flights
required to fly at higher altitudes: Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 24!! P .2d 497
(1952); Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87 (1942); Scott v. Dudley, 214
Ga. 565, 105 S.E.2d 752 (1958); Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., I N.J. Super 346, 61
A.2d 645 (1948); Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N.C. 47, 55 S.E.2d 923 (1949); Reynolds v.
Wilson, 2 Av. Cas. 14863 (Pa. C.P. 1949); Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp., 254
Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949).
27. See, e.g., Grzelka v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co., 286 Mich. 141,281 N.W. 568 (1938).
28. Residential area cases: Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.
1932); Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464 (1948); People v. Dycer Flying
Serv. Inc., 1 Av. Cas. 817 (Cal. Super Ct. 1939); Kramer v. Sweet, 179 Ore. 324, 169
P.2d 892 (1946) (slaughterhouse); Kroeker v. Westmoreland Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa.

June 1965)

Noise and the Law

1379

A plaintiff who establishes his right to an injunction may, in the
same suit, also recover compensation for damages to the effective
date of the decree. 29
It is often said that an injunction will not issue if there is no
evidence of a material decline in the value of a plaintiff's property or a material injury to his person.80 But as a practical matter,
a noise of a type that would be annoying to the average person
may be enjoined, even though damages are not recoverable if the
activity causing the noise falls within either of the two categories
listed above or if the noise can be abated at little cost to the defendant. 81 However, when that is not the case and the defendant's
activity is neither negligently designed or operated nor conducted
in an inappropriate place, an injunction will rarely issue without a
showing of material property damage.32 And when the defendant has
engaged in a naturally noisy activity over a long period of time and
there is no showing of negligence, his neighbors may be required to
tolerate a very substantial amount of annoyance. 38
Contrasting sharply with these situations requiring negligent design and operation, or inappropriate location, or material damage
before an injunction can be obtained, there are numerous circumstances in which a relatively minor showing of annoyance will be
deemed sufficient for the granting of relief. For example, if the defendant deliberately made the noise for the purpose of annoying
his neighbor, the plaintiff can enjoin the continuance of the noise
143, 117 Atl. 669 (1922) (planing mill); Gay v. Taylor, 19 Pa. D. &: C. 31 (C.P. 1932)
(private airport); Johnson v. Drysdale, 66 S.D. 436, 285 N.W. 301 (1939) (horses).
29. See, e.g., Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952).
30. "An injunction will not be granted unless there is either an actionable invasion
under the rule stated in this Section [dealing with liability for damages) or unless an
invasion is threatened which would be actionable hereunder." 4 REsTATEMENT, TORTS,
§ 822, general comment b (1939).
31. "If there be no such remedy at law, then, a fortiori, a court of equity ought to
give its aid to vindicate and perpetuate the right of the plaintiffs." Story, J., in Webb v.
Portland Mfg. Co.,• 29 Fed. Cas. 506 (No. 17322) (1838) (diversion of water). The
barking dog cases are typical instances of abatement without a showing of compensable
damage to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Adams v. Hamilton Carhartt Overall Co., 293 Ky. 443,
169 S.W.2d 294 (1943), and cases cited.
32. Injunction against flights operating from private air field denied where no
substantial property damage shown: Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511,
170 N.E. 385 (1930); Kuntz v. Werner Flying Serv., Inc., 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W.2d 476
(1950). Other examples in which injunction denied on failure to show substantial
property damage: Gunther v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &: Co., 157 F. Supp. 25 (N.D.
W.Va. 1957), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 255 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1958)
(blasting); Bostick v. Smoot Sand &: Gravel Corp., 154 F. Supp. 744 (D. Md. 1957), afj'd
on issue of nuisance, 260 F.2d 534,541 (4th Cir. 1958) (dredging).
33. See, e.g., Benton v. Kernan, 130 N.J. Eq. 193, 21 A.2d 755 (1941); Pawlowicz v.
American Locomotive Co., 90 Misc. 450, 154 N.Y.S. 768 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
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no matter how slight the annoyance. 84 Similarly, continuous loud
music used for advertising that is above the level of the other sounds
in the neighborhood can be enjoined without much showing of
economic loss or personal injury to the plaintiff. 85 In addition, courts
seem quite ready to grant equitable relief against noises resulting
from the operation of what our Puritan consciences might think of
as frivolous activities such as a carousel, a drive-in movie, an amusement park, a dance hall, or other place of entertainment.86 Here,
apparently, is one area where the low utility of defendant's conduct
scores heavily against him and is commonly outweighed by the
annoyance to his neighbor.
Between those cases at one end of the spectrum, where no damages can be proved and the defendant's conduct is reasonable, and
those at the other end, where damages can be proved and the defendant is guilty of negligent design or operation or improper location, lies an area of extreme difficulty. The most that can be said of
this gray area is that, when the plaintiff is being materially harmed
by the defendant's activity and the defendant would be materially
harmed if he were compelled to stop, courts are left to their ingenuity to devise compromise decrees that will allow the defendant
to continue his activity without the imposition of crippling economic
burdens and at the same time provide some measure of relief to the
plaintiff.87 A typical compromise is a curtailment of defendant's
34-. In Collier v. Ernst, 46 Pa. D. & C. l (C.P. 1942), the defendant was enjoined from
playing certain tunes on her marimba with the intention of annoying the plaintiff.
35. See Stodder v. Rosen Talking Mach. Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N.E. 251 (1922);
Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. McConnell, 236 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
36. "The operation of the theatre is neither a public duty nor a private necessity,
and if defendants cannot operate it, for whatever reason, without depriving plaintiffs
of the normal enjoyment of their homes, they must abandon the enterprise altogether.''
Anderson v. Guerrein Sky-Way Amusement Co., 346 Pa. 80, 29 A.2d 682 (1943). See
also, e.g., Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24-, 145 P.2d 552 (1944-). In many cases the
injunctive relief is limited to the evening hours when the noise may interfere with
.the plaintiff's sleep. See :Bartlett v. Moats, 120 Fla. 61, 162 So. 477 (1935); Asmann v.
Masters, 151 Kan. 281, 98 P.2d 419 (1940); Meadowbrook Swimming Club v. Albert,
173 Md. 641, 197 Atl. 146 (1938); Ritz v. Woman's Club, 114 W.Va. 675, 173 S.E. 564(1934) (all cases involving public dancing); Hansen v. School Dist., 61 Idaho 109, 98
P.2d 959 (1939) (night baseball).
37. "The very right on which the injured party stands •.. is a quantitative compromise between two conflicting interests. What may be an entirely tolerable adjustment, when the result is only to reward damages for the injury done, may become no
better than a means of extortion if the result is absolutely to curtail the defendant's
enjoyment of his land. Even though the defendant has no power to condemn, at times
it may be proper to require of him no more than to make good the whole injury once
and for all." Judge L. Hand in Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir.
1927). But see comment in Franke v. Wiltschek,• 209 F.2d 493, 499 n.6 (2d Cir. 1953).
See also Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87 (1942) (low flights prohibited).
Injunctive relief as a means of extortion is discussed in Developments in the LawInjunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994-, 1005-06 (1965).
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noisy activities during the usual hours of bedtime,88 but the only
limit to the possibilities of designing appropriate relief is the imagination of the court and of the parties applied to the peculiar
circumstances in each case.39
IV.

ABOUT NOISES MADE BY GOVERNMENT OR BY
GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED ENTITIES

Many of the most troublesome modem noises are caused by the
government or government-authorized entities involved in the operation of railroads, highways, and aircraft. The right to recover in
such cases is affected by two principles that apply to the performance
of governmental functions.
There is, first of all, the well-recognized concept of sovereign immunity-that the government is not liable for any of its acts except
those for which recovery has been expressly provided. Almost inextricably intertwined with that concept is the second principle that
members of the public shall bear without redress certain of the burdens that arise from action which the government has taken or has
authorized in the common interest. Wholly apart from the arbitrary
bar of sovereign immunity, there is the very practical consideration
that "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power." 40 A man drafted into the military forces may suffer a substantial loss of earnings for which he is not compensated. The operator of a formerly prosperous gasoline station may find his business
has disappeared after the opening of a new highway. An employer
may be put out of business by being required to raise his wages to
a minimum level. It is inevitable in our form of political system, and
perhaps in any form of political system, that the government, acting
in the public interest, will perform functions or authorize the performance of functions that will be harmful to some people and not
38. See, e.g., Kosich v. Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 1116 N.J. Eq. 571, 43 A.2d 15 (1945)
(poultry feed plant); City of Rochester v. Charlotte Docks Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup.
CL 1952) (emptying conveyor cars); Firth v. Scherzberg, 366 Pa. 443, 77 A.2d 443 (1951)
(private truck terminal); Rhoads v. Piacitelli, 2 Av. Cas. 14658 (Pa. C.P. 1948) (private
airport). See also cases cited in note 36 supra.
39. See, e.g., Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md. 348, 58 A.2d 656 (1948). "The
best solution is often to be found in what may be called an experimental injunction,
a definite order subject to revision in the light of experience therewith." 4 REsrATEMENT,
TORTS § 943, at p. 725, comment (1939). See also Developments in the Law-Injunctions,
78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 994, 1063-64 (1965).
40. Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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to others or that will be more harmful to some than to others. This
occurs every day, and in most cases no compensation is paid to those
harmed.
The application of these principles to the problem of noise is
illustrated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Richards v. Washington Terminal. 41 In that case, the plaintiff, whose
house was approximately one hundred feet from defendant's railroad track and tunnel, brought an action to recover for damage to
his property resulting from an alleged nuisance. Plaintiff suffered (1)
from the noise, vibration, and smoke of the passing trains "cracking
the walls ... breaking glass in the windows, and disturbing the peace
and slumber of the occupants" and (2) from gas and smoke forced
out of the tunnel and directed onto plaintiff's property by a fanning
system. Defendant's activities, however, had been authorized by the
government-its tracks and tunnel were located, constructed, and
maintained under acts of Congress. There was no claim that the
trains were negligently constructed, operated, or maintained.
The Court held that the plaintiff, like all other property owners
along a railroad right-of-way, was required to bear without redress
the amount of noise, vibration, and smoke incident to the running
of the trains. 42 However, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation to
the extent he was damaged by the fan arrangement which artificially
concentrated gas and smoke on the plaintiff to a degree not shared
by other property owners, "and this, without, so far as appears, any
real necessity existing for such damage." 43
The general conclusion to be drmm from Richards v. Washington Terminal is that under federal law no right of action exists in
private property owners for noise made by an entity functioning
under authority of the government (and, a fortiori, for noise made
by the government itself) even though the noise may cause a decline
in the value of affected property.H In such circumstances both damages and equitable relief are denied.
41. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
42. Id. at 553-54 (1914): "[R]ailroads constructed and operated for the public use,
although with private capital and for private gain, are not subject to actions in behalf
of neighboring property owners for the ordinary damages attributable to the operation
of the railroad, in the absence of negligence," including such damages as result from
"the noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains, the necessary emission of
smoke and sparks from the locomotives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the
normal and non-negligent operation of a railroad."
43. Id. at 556-57.
44. Railroad: Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). Military
aircraft: Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955, rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963); Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399
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However, it is necessary to qualify this broad rule somewhat by
two limitations: First, the activity being performed by the government or government-authorized entity must be sanctioned by law.45
Second, the facility creating the noise must be properly designed and
operated,46 and in certain limited cases a government-authorized
entity will be held responsible when it has not properly located the
facility. 47
The legal consequences of exceeding these limitations are not
always the same for the government as for a public utility. The
government begins with complete immunity, and claims against it
can be enforced only to the extent that this immunity has been
specifically waived. 48 The situation of the public utility is just the
(N.D. Te.'\'.. 1960); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958); Fitch
v. United States, 5 Av. Cas. 17841 (D. Kan. 1958); Boskovich v. United States, 3 Av. Cas.
17252 (D. Utah 1950); Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. CI. 1964); Aaron v.
United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283
(Ct. Cl. 1959). Military aircraft on warm-up pads: Mock v. United States, 8 Av. Cas.
18080 (Ct. CI. 1964). Military bombing and ground detonation: Nunnally v. United
States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956). Engine test cell: Bellamy v. United States, 235 F.
Supp. 139 (E.D. S.C. 1964); Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
But cf. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P .2d 540 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 989 (1965); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
45. See Transportation Co. v. Chicago,• 99 U.S. 635, 640 (18i9): "If the statute be
such as the legislature has power to pass, the acts are lawful, and are not nuisances,
unless the power has been exceeded."
46. E.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952);
Alford v. Illinois Central R. Co.,• 86 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. La. 1949), afj'd, 187 F.2d 144
(5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 825 (1951) (smoke). See Chronister v. City of
Atlanta, 99 Ga. App. 447, 108 S.E.2d 731 (1959); Brooks v. Patterson, 159 Fla. 263, 31
So. 2d 472 (1947); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Thrasher
v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Jeffers v. Montana Power Co.,•
68 Mont. 114,217 Pac. 652 (1923). The cases enjoining a nuisance from the discharge of
city sewage (see, e.g., note in 77 L. Ed. 1213) are illustrative since it is obvious that
sewers can be designed which will not cause nuisances.
47. In deference to the executive and legislative branches, courts will not ordinarily
contest the location of a government facility. "[T]he law does not permit courts to
select the location of sites for the establishment of essential public enterprises." State
ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698, 709, appeal
dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d.9ll (1948). See also United States v. 64.88 Acres
of Land,• 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957). But cf. Hassell v. City &: County of San Francisco,• 11 Cal. 2d 168, 78 P.2d 1021 (1938).
In the case of a public utility, the reasonableness of the location can be questioned
when feasible alternatives exist, as for example, when the question is the location of
railroad shops and switchyards as distinguished from the tracks themselves. Baltimore
&: P. R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 330-32 (1883). But cf. Thompson v.
Kimball, 165 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1948), denying recovery for noise of switching engines
spotted so that plaintiff "gets it worst," since that is merely a matter of degree in a
situation where the injury is "common to the public whose property is situated •••
near the switch-yard."
Throughout this article, the phrase "public utility" is used in its broader sense-an
entity deriving its authority to operate from the government.
48. In the case of the federal government, liability can be enforced only when a
"-taking" occurs under the fifth amendment for which an action can be brought under
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reverse. Claims against utilities can be enforced except to the extent
they are performing acts specifically authorized by the government;
their immunity is strictly limited to that which has been derived from
the government, and their acts are protected only so long as they are
a necessary consequence of the exercise of the authority granted by
the government. 49 Objectionable actions which fall within such
authority are sometimes referred to as "legalized nuisances.'' 50 Any
action outside such authority subjects the utility to liability in the
same manner as any private citizen. 51 Thus, the railroad in Richards
v. Washington Terminal was responsible for the smoke concentrated
on the plaintiff because the conduct of the railroad in this respect
was not a necessary consequence of the authority granted to it by the
government. 52
the Tucker Act, 62 Stat. 940 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958) or
when a government employee has committed a tort of the type for which recovery has
been provided, since 1946, by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 982 (1948), 28
U.S.C. § 2671 (1958) et seq. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, recovery is not permitted for acts of an employee "exercising due care in the execution of a statute or
regulation" or claims "based upon the exercise [of] •.. a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency . . . ." Ordinarily, no recovery is permitted for the
deliberate act of government in performing its functions. Thus, for example, while the
act permits no recovery for damages resulting from government construction or operation of an airport next to a residence, it would permit recovery for damages resulting
from the negligent or wrongful act of a military pilot operating from the airport.
United States v. Gaidys,• 194 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952). See also Dalehite v. United
States,• 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953), and discussion of Federal Tort Claims Act in 2
HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS 1648-67 (1956).
49. "The immunity is limited to such damages as naturally and unavoidably result
from the proper conduct of the road and are shared generally by property owners whose
lands lie within range of the inconveniences necessarily incident to proximity to a
railroad." Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546,554 (1914).
50. "That cannot be a nuisance, such as to give a common-law right of action, which
the law authorizes," Transportation Co. v. Chicago,• 99 U.S. 635, 640 (1879). See also
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 551, 554 (1914), and compare
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946). And see Note, Nuisance and Legislative
Authorization, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 781 (1952).
Legislation in several states provides that "Nothing which is done or maintained
under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance." See, e.g., CAL. C1v.
CODE § 3482 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 52-108 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 57-104
(1962); N.D. CENT. CODE 42-01-12 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 50 § 4 (1962); S.D. CODE
§ 37.4703 (1939); WASH. REV. CODE§ 7.48.160 (1952).
51. "When an act is done by a [railway) company in excess of its powers, or in a
wanton and careless use of them, there is an injury for which the sufferer retains a
remedy by an action at common law, or by suit in equity for an injunction; but things
done by a company in the due execution of its powers are lawful, being duly authorized,
and no action lies on account of them." Lord Westbury, dissenting on other grounds,
in Ricket v. Metropolitan Ry.,• L.R. 2 H.L. 175,202 (1867).
52. The court states that, if the damage could not be prevented, the railroad should
proceed to acquire plaintiff's property by purchase or condemnation, but, if the damage
is "readily preventable, the statute furnishes no excuse and defendant's responsibility
follows on general principles" (i.e., to the extent its action is outside the statute, the
railroad has no immunity and must pay for the nuisance). Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914). See also Baltimore &: P. R.R. v. Fifth Baptist
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Claims which have arisen from the sonic boom of supersonic aircraft operated by the government fall within the second of the two
limitations on the broad rule of no liability. A normal, properly conducted flight is one that accelerates to supersonic speed at altitudes
high enough to avoid the overpressures that cause physical damage. 53
Since physical damage is not a necessary consequence of operating
supersonic aircraft, persons suffering such damage are entitled to
recover. 1H However, no recovery will be allowed for the mere annoyance caused by sonic booms, even though the annoyance may be
severe enough to occasion a decline in property values. This is a
burden shared by society in general-a part of the burden of communal living.
The reasons leading to these results are to be found in an analysis
of our constitutional structure.
A.

The Federal Constitution

Since there is hardly a government act which could not cause someone substantial damage, an arbitrary boundary line must be dra-vm
Church, 108 U.S. 317, 331 (1883), which points out that the authority conferred on
the railroad was accompanied by an "implied qualification" governing where it could
place its works.
53. The design criteria of the supersonic transport aircraft currently under consideration by the United States government provide that the "maximum over-pressure"
(i.e., the pressures created by the shock waves in excess of normal pressures at sea level)
shall not exceed two pounds per square foot. "Request for Proposals for the Development of a Commercial Supersonic Transport," Federal Aviation Agency, August 15,
1963, p. 19. Experiments of the Federal Aviation Agency have demonstrated that overpressures of two pounds per square foot or less will not break normal window glass.
Power, Some Results of the Oklahoma City Sonic Boom Tests, 4 MATERIALS R.EsEARCH
&: STANDARDS 623 (1964). See Roth, Sonic Boom, 44 A.B.A.J. 216, 220 (1958), for Air Force
standard operating procedures.
54. "According to the face of the amended complaint, the United States committed
a wrong for which it was liable under the Tort Claims Act . . . ." Lloyds' London v.
Blair, 262 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1958). See also Coxsey v. Halaby, 334 F.2d 286 (10th Cir.
1964), and 231 F. Supp. 978 (D.C. Okla. 1964). But see Huslander v. United States, 234
F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. N.Y. 1964), in which the court granted the government's motion
for summary judgment on the theory that undertaking supersonic flight was a "dis•
cretionary function" under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958).
This conclusion seems to be based on a misunderstanding of Dalehite, in which
the Supreme Court denied recovery for damage due to the explosion of government-made fertilizer which "experience showed could be handled safely in the
manner it was handled here" and cited McPherson v. Buick to indicate that recovery
would be allowed when damage is foreseeable as the "probable" result of a government
activity. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953). Thus, in the Huslander case,
if the flight had been specifically authorized by the Air Force, those granting the
authorization knew it would break windows. But the court in Huslander even denied
plaintiffs the opportunity to "ascertain whether established policies and procedures
[of the Air Force] were adhered to in this case." 234 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
An extended discussion of federal liability for sonic booms appears in Comment, 31
So. CAL. L. REv. 259 (1958).
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between compensable and noncompensable injury. In the case of the
federal government that boundary was embodied in the fifth amendment which provides that property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
"The Fifth Amendment ... undertakes to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by public improvements so that
they will fall upon the public rather than wholly upon those who
happen to lie in the path of the project. It does not undertake,
however, to socialize all losses, but only those which result from
a taking of property. If damages from any other cause are to
be absorbed by the public, they must be assumed by act of Congress and may not be awarded by the courts merely by implication from the constitutional provision." 55
The words "taking" or "taken" have become so tainted with
secondary meanings that it is easy to overlook the fact that when
Smith has "taken" my horse, it ordinarily means that Smith now
has in his possession a horse that was formerly in my possession.1;o
It does not mean that Smith has injured my horse. 57 This common55. United States v. Willow River Power Co.,• 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). See also
Legal Tender Cases,• 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871). But cf. the dissenting opinion
of Chief Judge Murrah in Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 587 (10th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955, rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963): "fairness and justice,
as between the State and the citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the
public and not by the individual alone," cited with approval in Martin v. Port of
Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
56. "TAKE, to lay hold of, seize, grasp, get." SKEAT, ETYMOLOGICAL D1crIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (rev. ed. 1956). And this is the meaning of the word as it is
used in the distinguished ancestors of the constitution, Magna Carta §§ 28, 30 and 31
and Act Abolishing Relics of Feudalism and Fixing an Excise, 12 Charles 2, c. 24, § 12.
So also in Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, February 6, 1778, Art. XX, a
contemporary of the Constitution, which deals separately with goods "taken" from
merchants of the two countries and "injury" done them. This use of "taken" as an
act of expropriation has been carried forward into a number of our modem treaties
which provide that property of nationals "shall not be taken ••. except for a public
purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation."
See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Pakistan, Art. VI § 4, 12 U.S.T.
111, 113 (1961). The identical language has even been used in a recent agreement
benveen Cuba and Japan. Jennings, The Sabbatino Controver.sy, 20 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 81, 88 (1965). In sum, the internationally accepted interpretation of "take"
is exactly its original meaning-to "seize." After seven hundred years of consistent usage,
it is difficult to see how this word can be tortured into a meaning broad enough to
encompass damage occasioned by objectionable noise.
But see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 54-55 (1964): "The
direct antecedents of the just compensation provision of the fifth amendment are the
jurisprudential writings of such 17th and early 18th century scholars as Grotius,
Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, and Vattel," who were "essentially non-property
oriented."
57. Constitutional protection exists only when property is taken for a "public use."
Although the latter word is frequently slighted, it confirms the concept of a purposeful
appropriation of something that is wanted, in marked contrast to government action
that incidentally happens to cause damage. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp.,•
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sense interpretation is close to the original constitutional sense, and
even twentieth century cases speak of "taking" as the type of intentional act which would create an implied contract to pay. 58
Despite loose language in some Supreme Court opinions,59 the
actual holdings of the Court dealing with rights in tangible property
stick surprisingly close to the original concept, in which a taking
involves the displacement of the ovmer from some part of his property by the government with the result that the government occupies
what the landowner once occupied or had the right to occupy. 60 The
323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945): "In its primary meaning, the term 'taken' would seem to
signify something more than destruction, for it might well be claimed that one does
not take what he destroys. But the construction of the phrase has not been so narrow.
The courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the
accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking." This explanation
is correct so far as it goes, but it fails to state the whole rule, which is that "the
deprivation of the former owner"' must be due to an action of the government which
demonstrates its intention to appropriate. See notes 66 & 72 infra.
58. See, e.g., Bothwell v. United States,• 254 U.S. 231 (1920). "There was no actual
taking of these things by the United States, and consequently no basis for an implied
promise to make compensation."' Id. at 233. See also Developments in the LawRemedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827, 876-82 (1957).
59. For example: (I) "[T)here are numerous authorities to sustain the doctrine that
a serious interruption to the common and necessary use of property may be . . •
equivalent to the taking of it, and that under the constitutional provisions it is not
necessary that the land should be absolutely taken."' Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,•
80 U.S. 166, 179 (1872), in which the court held that a flooding of plaintiff's land by a
dam erected by the government was a taking. (2) "[A] destruction for public purposes
may as well be a taking as would be an appropriation for the same end."' United States
v. Welch,• 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910) (land flooded and private right-of-way cut off).
(3) "Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its
effects are so complete as -to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
subject matter, to amount to a taking,"' and "it matters not whether they were taken
over by the Government or destroyed, since, as has been said, destruction is tantamount
to taking,"' United States v. General Motors Corp.,• 323 U.S. 373 at 383 and 384 (1945),
in which the Court held that when the Government took a temporary term from a
leaseholder it must also pay the cost of the leaseholder's removal from the premises.
60. The following Supreme Court cases have been frequently cited, along with
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), and United States v. General Motors Corp.,
supra note 59, as extreme examples of taking: Armstrong v. United States,• 364 U.S. 40
(1960) (taking occurred when government exercised its contractual right to have a
defaulting contractor transfer work-in-process to government, thereby depriving
plaintiff of the ability to enforce his materialman's lien on the work); United States
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,• 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (a taking occurred when government
raised river level to improve navigation, thereby "underflowing"' plaintiff's property
and rendering it unfit for farming); United States v. Dickinson,• 331 U.S. 745 (1947)
(when government, to improve navigation, took plaintiff's property for flooding, it
must also pay for resulting erosion and easement on remaining properties which would
be intermittently flooded); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel v. United States,• 260
U.S. 327 (1922) (establishment of a land battery permanently aimed over plaintiff's
property and a fire control station on such property may be a taking if it shows an
"abiding purpose to fire when the United States sees fit'); Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon,• 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (state statute prohibiting mining of coal by subsurface owners, except by complying with "commercially impracticable"' requirements
for support of the surface, would constitute taking: "while property may be regulated
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rule seems to be that there can be no "taking" of tangible property under the federal constitution unless two conditions exist:
First, there must be a physical or direct "invasion" of the property
and, second, the invasion must be of a type which results in "exclusive" appropriation. 61 To have a taking the governmental use must be
of a nature that excludes simultaneous use of the same property
interest by the title holder. Or phrased differently, the government
must effectively displace the owner from some part of his property. 62
Consistent with this definition, the Court found that the noise and
vibration did not constitute a "taking" in Richards v. Washington
Terminal, despite the admitted damage to the neighboring properties.63 And one strongly suspects that noise alone, no matter how
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking'');
United States v. Welch,• 217 U.S. 333 (1910) (when government took land for flooding,
it must also pay for right-of-way rendered useless as a result of flooding).
61. "(T]here was a physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and a
practical ouster of his possession." Gibson v. United States,• 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897).
A "direct invasion" is used in United States v. Cress,• 243 U.S. 316, 327, 328 (1917) and
in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946). The phrase "physical invasion"
and "directly encroaching" appears in Transportation Co. v. Chicago,• 99 U.S. 635, 642
(1879).
"(T]here is no exclusive and permanent appropriation of any portion of plaintiff's
land [and] since he is not wholly excluded from the use and enjoyment of his property,
there has been no 'taking' of the land in the ordinary sense." Richards v. ,vashington
Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1914). In Causby, the Court said that "an accurate
description of the property taken is essential, since that interest vests in the United
States." United States v. Causby, supra, at 267. The term "practical ouster of his
possession" is used in Transportation Co. v. Chicago,• supra, at 642, as well as in
Gibson v. United States,• supra. In Sanguinetti v. United States,• 264 U.S. 146, 149
(1924), the Court said it was necessary that there be "an actual, permanent invasion of
the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an injury to the property."
62. "[I]t is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from
it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a
taking." United States v. Cress,• 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917). Compare 2 HARPER &: JAMES,
TORTS 1616 (1956): "It is enough that defendant's conduct destroys or substantially
impairs the use of plaintiff's property either permanently or for a protracted period.
. • • Consequential damage, however . . . are (sic) not included." See also Harvey,
Landowners' Rights in the Air Age-The Airport Dilemma, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1313,
1321 (1958), in which it is suggested that a taking occurs when the infringement is
"sufficiently serious."
63. "(T]here is no exclusive and permanent appropriation of any portion of plaintiff's land [and] since he is not wholly excluded from the use and enjoyment of his
property, there is no 'taking' of the land in the ordinary sense." Richards v. ,vashington
Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1914). (Emphasis added.) But see Batten v. United
States, 306 F.2d 584, 598 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955, rehearing denied,
372 U.S. 925 (1963), in which the dissenting opinion erroneously assumes that the
Supreme Court in Richards v. Washington Terminal, supra, decided there had been
a "constitutional taking by indirect interference" through the smoke concentrated on
plaintiff. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp.,• 323 U.S. 373, 378, 384 (1944). See
also Sullivan v. Commonwealth,• 335 Mass. 619, 625, 142 N.E.2d 347, 352 (1957); Friendship Cemetery v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 610, 81 A.2d 57 (1951); 54 A.L.R.2d 768
(1957); McKee v. City of Akron,• 176 Ohio St. 282, 285, 199 N.E.2d 592, 594 (1964).
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aggravating (short of the lethal intensities with which our military
forces have been experimenting, or something nearly as drastic)
cannot constitute a taking as defined by the cases; i.e., a displacement
of the lando·wner by a direct or physical invasion of the government. 64 If "physical invasion" alone were the test, noise might constitute such an invasion-as Piggott pointed out as early as 1885.65
However, by the second requirement of "exclusive" appropriation,
the Supreme Court made it plain that sounds drifting through the air
are not the type of invasion contemplated.
In considering these constitutional standards, it should be noted
that the scope of this article is confined to "taking" as it applies to
overt acts which affect physical property. The invasion concept is
obviously inapplicable either to legislative acts of the government
affecting physical property or to any acts of the government affecting
interests in intangible property, which are also entitled to constitutional protection. 66 Some of those ·writing on this subject have at64. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946), counsel for the government
agreed that if overflights made plaintiff's land uninhabitable, there would be a taking,
and this would seem inescapable regardless of the cause if we define "uninhabitable" as
meaning that the landowner has been involuntarily displaced rather than subjected to
an aggravated case of discomfort. Compare Beseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 N.J.L.
235, 236, 13 Atl. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1888), afj'd, 52 N.J.L. 221, 20 Atl. 169 (Ct. Err. &: App.
1889); Taylor v. Chicago, M. &: St. P. R.R., 85 Wash. 592, 594-95, 148 Pac. 887 (1915)
(denying relief to an adjacent property owner despite the allegation that his property
had been rendered "uninhabitable" by passing trains). See also Richards v. Washington
Terminal Co., supra note 63, at 553, stating that the legislature "may not confer
immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in
effect to a taking of private property for public use." Six state cases were cited in
support of this statement. One involved the discharge of slush on plaintiff's property.
Sadlier v. City of New York,• 40 Misc. 78, 81 N.Y.S. 308 (Sup. Ct. 1903). Another related
to an embankment on defendant's property that affected the foundation of plaintiff's
house. Costigan v. Pennsylvania R.R.,• 54 N.J.L. 233, 23 Atl. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1892). The
remaining four cases related to odors and noises from a gas tank and railroad yard
facilities which should have been placed elsewhere, following Baltimore &: P.R.R. v.
Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883), note 47 supra. In one of these, Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Angel, 41 N.J. Eq. 316, 7 Atl. 432 (1886), which involved operation of a switchyard, the court stated, in a dictum, that smells and noise may constitute a taking of
property. Two years later, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court limited the Angel
case to its facts; i.e., where a railroad was "doing certain acts which were obviously
ultra vires." Beseman v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra, at 241. See also Roman Catholic
Church v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 Fed. 897 (3d Cir. 1913) (interpreting the law of
New Jersey).
65. PIGGOTT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TORTS 331 (1885). The sound wave argument
is pressed in Lester, Nuisance as a "Taking" of Property, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 537
(1963). See also comment in Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324 n.4, 391 P.2d
540 n.4 (1964). And compare Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640, 643-45 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
66. Here one is thrown back to the broader interpretation of the Legal Tender
Cases,• 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871), in which the Court said that taking
referred to "a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from
the exercise of lawful power." The distinction between a "direct appropriation" by
the government and "consequential damages" as the indirect result of action by the
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tempted to throw all types of cases together higgledy-piggledy and to
come out with a generalization which appears to cover them all, such
as the statement that "any substantial interference which destroys
or lessens the value of private property or the rights or enjoyment
incidental to such property is, in fact and in law, a 'taking' in the
constitutional sense, even though title and possession of the owner
remain undisturbed." 67 If this bald generalization were true, most
tax legislation would constitute a taking. 68
government, seems to be largely one of intent: "There can be no recovery ••• if the
intention to take is lacking." Mitchell v. United States,• 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925).
When the government admits an intention to take, it ordinarily commences an
action to condemn. The cases coming before the courts, therefore, are usually instances
in which the government has denied a taking, and the court has the problem of
deciding whether some ambiguous action of the government demonstrates an intention
to take. "Traditionally, we have treated the issue as to whether a particular governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as being a question properly
turning upon the particular circumstances of each case." United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co.,• 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). At least three different tests appear to
have been applied depending on the type of property and nature of the government
act:
(I) When the government commits an overt act that affects physical property, a
taking will be assumed only when there has been an invasion resulting in exclusive
possession by the government of some part of plaintiff's property. See, e.g., United States
v. Kansas City Life,• 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v. Dickinson,• 331 U.S. 745
(1946); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Portsmouth Harbor L. &: H. Co. v.
United States,• 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v. Welch,• 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
(2) When the action of the government is by legislative proscription, a taking will
be assumed when the plaintiff is excluded by terms of the law from using some part of
his property. Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n,• 379 U.S. 487 (1965); Thompson
v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.,• 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,• 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Compare United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,•
supra, involving the exercise of war power.
(3) When the action of the government affects intangible property, a taking will be
assumed if the government is "the direct positive beneficiary" of the loss suffered by
the plaintiff. Armstrong v. United States,• 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960). See also Cities Serv.
Co. v. McGrath,• 342 U.S. 330 (1952). This is reminiscent of ,the implied contract
theory referred to in note 58, supra, that was an essential feature of many of the
earlier cases. But see Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,• 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
67. 17 s.w. L.J. 308, 310 (1963) (borrowing from 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 259
(3d ed. 1950)). The same thought is expressed in the current edition of 2 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1963), which cites United States v. Dickinson,
United States v. Causby, and Portsmouth Harbor L. &: H. Co. v. United States, supra
note 66, and quotes at length from Smith v. Erie R.R.,• 134- Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E.2d
310 (1938), an access case which says that "if there is no taking there can be no recovery
of consequential damages."
Even cautiously worded generalizations in this field seem to lend themselves to
distortion. Lewis stated: "Whenever the lawful rights of an individual to the possession,
use or enjoyment of his land are in any degree abridged or destroyed by reason of the
exercise of eminent domain, his property is, pro tanto, taken and he is entitled to
compensation." I LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN 56 (3d ed. 1909). (Emphasis added.) At an
earlier point, Lewis pointed out the several ways, other than exercise of eminent
domain, government can use or interfere with private property, flatly concluding, "it
seems objectionable to define eminent domain as the power to take property for a public
use." Id. at 3-5. Yet in Morrison v. Clackamas County,• 14-1 Ore. 564, 568, 18 P.2d 814,
816 (1933), the Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case involving erosion of soil as the
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There have been two aviation cases involving flights over neighboring property in which the Supreme Court has held that there was
a taking, Causby v. United States 69 and Griggs v. County of Allegheny.70 In each of these cases there existed both the invasion and
exclusive use which are required to effect a displacement of the property owner. 71 The "taking" was not based on the existence of an
objectionable noise. The objectionable noise was there and may have
caused damage, but damage alone does not constitute a taking. 72 In
Causby, military aircraft regularly passed over the plaintiff's land at
altitudes of eighty-three feet. 73 This effectively displaced the plaintiff:
"The superadjacent air space at this low altitude is so close to the
land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of
the land itself." 74 In Griggs a similar displacement was found, with
result of a bridge constructed on adjoining property, cited Lewis as supporting the
statement that "any destruction, restriction or interruption of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property of a person for a public purpose constitutes a
'taking' thereof." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, Lewis' statement that there is a taking when, by exercise of eminent domain,
rights in use and enjoyment of property have been damaged, is converted by the Oregon
court into a conclusion that there is taking when there has been any interruption in the
use and enjoyment of property for a public purpose. In this distorted form the rule
became the support for Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100
(1962).
68. In addition to taxes, four other types of non-compensable interference are
listed in I LEwis, op. cit. supra note 67, at 5.
The proponents of these broadened interpretations of "taking" never face up to the
application of such a rule to personal property. If a United States mail truck dents the
fender of a car, thereby lessening its value, is this too a "taking in the constitutional
sense?"
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964), suggests that a taking
occurs "when an individual or limited group in society sustains a detriment to legally
acquired existing economic values as a consequence of government activity which
enhances the economic value of some governmental enterprise."
69. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
70. 369 U.S. 84, petition for rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962).
71. According to 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS 1615 n.13 (1956), in Causby "the Court
was driven either to find a taking or to deny relief, because of the unavailability of
recovering on a nuisance theory at least before the Federal Tort Claims Act." See also
Note, 59 MICH. L. REv. 968, 969 (1961). It now seems plain that the Federal Tort Claims
Act would not permit recovery in such a case unless the military pilots were negligently or intentionally flying below the prescribed altitudes necessary for safe flight
to and from the airport. See note 48 supra.
72. "[D]amage alone gives courts no power to require compensation where there
is not an actual taking of property." United States v. Willow River Power Co.,• 324
U.S. 499, 510 (1945). See also United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,• 357 U.S.
155, 168 (1958).
73. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946). This was 67 feet above
plaintiff's house, 18 feet above the highest tree on plaintiff's land.
74. Id. at 265. The government abandoned the use of the easement after the end
of the war. Causby v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 262 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
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aircraft regularly passing on a glide path eleven feet above plaintiff's
chimney. 75
Both of these decisions were written by Mr. Justice Douglas.
The rationale in each case was that a taking had occurred because
the landowner had lost the use of the airspace immediately above
his property to the extent it had been occupied by the government:
"[I]t is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings
could not be erected, trees could not be planted and even fences
could not be run. The principle is recognized when the law gives
a remedy in case overhanging structures are erected on adjoining
land. The landowner owns at least as much of the space above
the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land." 76
Although this seems clear enough, there are some who claim that
what the Court really meant to say was that the noise made by the
aircraft, not their use of the plaintiff's airspace, constituted the taking. For these disbelievers, a few more words may be added. 77 The
opinion in Causby contains a fact statement of approximately five
hundred words, in which the frequency and level of flights as well
as the resulting noise, glare and risk of accidents are described.
This fact statement is followed by a discussion of the relevant law
for approximately three thousand words. The legal discussion is
devoted entirely to the rights of landowners in the use of airspace
above their property78 and only two references are made to noise,
75. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 85, 86 (1962). "The question whether
repeated aircraft overflights constitute a taking of particular property under the
Causby and Griggs doctrine depends upon three factors: (1) the character of the land
itself and (2) the altitude and (3) the frequency of the overflights." City of Atlanta v.
Donald, 9 Av. Cas. 17439, 17443 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).
76. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). (Emphasis added.) Once
a taking occurs, the damage from noise is compensable. See cases cited in note 86 infra.
77. The dissent of Mr. Justice Black (Mr. Justice Burton concurring) in Causby,
contended the majority had wrongfully found that "noise and glare" constituted a
taking. 328 U.S. at 269. See also Comment, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1581 (1961): "The
compensable 'taking' ... consists not in an appropriation of the landowner's property
in a zone or column of airspace but rather in the creation of noise which substantially
interferes with surface use and enjoyment." Id. at 1585. This questionable analysis was
adopted a year later by the majority in Thornburg 'v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178,
376 P.2d 100 (1962), and adopted in substance by Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.
2d 324, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). See also Dunham, Griggs v.
Allegheny County in Perspective-Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law,
in SUPREME COURT REvmw 63, 88 (1962).
78. "The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing
land...• [T]he use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility
of the land and cause a diminution in its value," United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
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each of which is inconsistent with the concept that the noise constituted a taking. The first, and very pertinent, reference serves to
distinguish Richards v. Washington Terminal, where "property
owners whose land adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for
damages resulting from the noise," whereas in Causby "the line of
flight is over the land." 79 The second, and equally significant, reference is the statement that "The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment." 80
Similarly in the Griggs opinion ·written sixteen years later, after
once stating the facts, Mr. Justice Douglas never again mentions
noise. The decision in Griggs is based on the opinion in Causby:
"[A]s we said in the Causby case, the use of land presupposes
the use of some of the airspace above it.... Othenvise no home
could be built, no tree planted, no fence constructed, no chimney
erected. An invasion of the 'superadjacent airspace' will often
'affect the use of the surface of the land itself.' 328 U.S. at 265.'' 81
If the plaintiffs in Causby and Griggs had merely been subjected to
262 (1946); "[T]he flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is
as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon
it." Id. at 264; "[I]f the United States erected an elevated railway over respondents' land
at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a partial taking, even
though none of the supports ... rested on the land •.•. \Vhile the owner does not in
any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that space left between
buildings for the purpose of light and air is used ..•• We think that the landowner,
as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it [the superadjacent airspace] and that
invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface." Id. at 264-65.
79. Id. at 262. (Emphasis added.) According to Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d
324, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965), the surface displacement
was of no importance: "The reliance placed upon the high noise level by the Supreme
Court in both decisions, without detectable preoccupation with its angle of incidence,
strongly indicates that the holdings are not limited to those instances where the
aircraft passes directly over the land." See also Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore.
178, 193, 376 P.2d 100, 107 (1962): "Whether expressed in so many words or not, the
principle found in .•• Causby .•• is that when the government conducts an activity
upon its own land which ••• is sufficiently disturbing to the use and enjoyment of
neighboring lands to amount to a taking thereof, then the public ..• should bear the
cost of such public benefit." (Emphasis added.)
80. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
81. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1962). Mr. Justice Black dissented
in both Causby and Griggs. In the first case, joined by Mr. Justice Burton, he claimed
that there had been no taking-that the majority had based its decision on "noise and
glare" which is "at best an action in tort." United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 269-70
(1946). In the second case, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, he agreed with the Court
there had been a taking "under the Causby holding," but asserted that the taking in
Griggs was by the federal government and not by the defendant county (the airport
operator) as decided by the majority. Mr. Justice Black again claimed that Causby
based its finding of taking on "noise, vibration and fear caused by constant and
extremely low overflights." Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 85, 91 (1962).
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the noise they experienced, no recovery would have been allowed.
This is the conclusion that was reached in Richards v. Washington Terminal, and it is also the conclusion in all the federal
court cases on aviation. Flights over private land may constitute a
taking if they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land below.
However, no recovery is allowed nearby landowners for the damage
to their property caused solely by the noise to which they are subjected. 82
The distinction just described has been said to make hard law
since compensation under the Constitution is provided to the landowner "directly under" the path of low-flying aircraft, but not to
the landowner whose property is a "fraction of an inch" beyond the
wing tip of the same aircraft. 83 This kind of argument makes two
erroneous assumptions: first, that the nature of the injury to the two
landowners is identical; and second, that whenever there is damage,
compensation must be paid-an obviously unsupportable conclusion. 84 In answer to the first assumption, it can be accepted for purposes of argument that the noise suffered by the two landowners is
exactly the same. The difference is that the landowner over whose
property the flight path has been laid has lost the use of that airspace.
The right to the exclusive use of a definable, although invisible, portion of his property has passed from him to the airport operator just
82. See aviation cases in note 44 supra. "We are referred to no decisions holding
that the mere maintenance of a nuisance effects a taking of adjoining or nearby
property absent repeated physical invasions which are cognizable as the imposition
of a servitude-the taking of an easement-rather than the tortious creation of a
liability for which damages are recoverable under state law." Mosher v. City of Boulder,
225 F. Supp. 32, 36 (D. Colo. 1964). "We are cited to no decisions holding that the
United States is liable for noise, vibration, or smoke without a physical invasion."
Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955
(1963).
83. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 989 (1965). See also Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 198, 376 P.2d
100 (1962). The statement of the problem somewhat distorts the facts since where there
has been a taking the easement acquired has been usually described as a right•of-way
"1500 feet wide or 750 feet on either side of the center line of the runway" (e.g., United
States v. 765.56 Acres of Land, 174 F. Supp. 1,3 (E.D.N.Y. 1959)), thus providing a
swath that is over a quarter of a mile wide, or eight times the breadth of the largest jet
aircraft now in service. This is more than wide enough to cover normal deviations
from the flight path and only rarely would an aircraft using the right-of-way pass a
"fraction of an inch" from the property of adjacent landowners.
84. Sec cases cited in note 72 supra. Compare Comment, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1581,
1583 (1961), urging a nuisance theory of relief: "Attention would be focused on the degree of actual interference, rather than on formalistic factors like the relationship of
the flight path to a particular zone or column of air space." See also Spies & McCoid,
Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. R.Ev. 437, 444 n.27
(1962).
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as definitely as if a visible highway, railway, or canal had been laid
out on the surface of his property. Although the flight path in the air
(like the pipeline laid below the surface of the earth) is not visible,
in each case the landlord has been displaced from some part of his
property. He can no longer build in the flight path or safely fly
kites in it. But, his neighbor whose property lies a "fraction of
an inch" from the flight path may do whatever building or kite flying
he chooses. Moreover, there are added risks of physical damage and
injury imposed on the landowner whose property is subject to a
flight easement. 85 Thus, despite the assumed equality of the noise
level, there is a very different impact on the two landowners. Both
have been damaged, but in only one case has property been taken.
And the federal constitution, along with half of the state constitutions, provides for compensation only when there has been a
taking. Once the taking is established, the landowner may recover
for consequential damages to the balance of his property, and this
would include the damage from noise of aircraft utilizing the flight
path. 86 This principle that a landowner whose property is taken may
recover for consequential damages to his remaining property, but
that a neighboring landowner may not recover for damage arising
from the same objectionable activity, was well established long before noise from airplanes became a problem. 87
In summary, then, when we are talking about real property, a
taking occurs when landowners give up a portion of their property
for use by the government or a public utility functioning under
authority of the government. No legal difference exists between the
85. The resulting fear has been a major factual element in most taking cases. "If
we had engine failure- we would have no course but to plow into your house." Griggs
v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 85, 87 (1962). See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 259 (1946); Bacon v. United States, 295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Johnson v. Airport
Authority, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426 (1962). Noise is more disturbing to individuals
who associate the noise with risk of physical injury to themselves. "Eighty per cent of
those who complained of aircraft noise reported some fear in connection with aircraft,
either fear of machines crashing on the house or else unwillingness to fly themselves."
HANDBOOK OF NOISE CONTROL 10-12 (Harris ed. 1957). See also note 6 supra.
86. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 222 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955); Mock v. United
States, 8 Av. Cas. 18080 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Bowling Green Airport Board v. Long, 364
S.W.2d 167 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Johnson v. Airport Authority, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d
426 (1962); Tennessee v. Rascoe, 181 Tenn. 43, 178 S.W.2d 392 (1944). This is frequently
referred to as "severance damage." Spies &: McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages
in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REV. 437,441 (1962).
But any recovery for such consequential damages will be limited to those caused
by activity on the property that has been taken. Campbell v. United States,• 266 U.S.
368 (1924); Boyd v. United States, supra; People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451
n.108 (1960).
87. See Campbell v. United States,• supra note 86; Sadlier v. City of New York,•
185 N.Y. 408, 78 N.E. 272 (1906); Church v. Railroad, 36 Utah 238, 103 Pac. 243 (1909).
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low-level aircraft flight path which interferes with surface use of the
land and the direct appropriation of the surface itself for railways,
highways, canals or transmission lines, or the direct appropriation
of the subsurface for the laying of pipelines. Those whose property
is taken for any of these purposes can recover for the value of the
property taken plus any consequential damages to the property that
has not been taken, and this would include damages from noise and
other objectionable activity resulting from the proposed use of the
property taken. Neighbors, who have not had property taken, cannot
recover for such consequential damages due to noise or other types
of nuisances: "the doctrine has become so well established that it
amounts to a rule of property, and should be modified, if at all, only
by the lawmaking power.'' 88 This is the law under the federal constitution and is, or should be, the law in those states with similar constitutional provisions. 89
B.

The English Law

The law of England as it applies to these problems is of general
interest for comparison with the federal pattern, and is of specific
interest in understanding some of the state constitutions.
The common-law rule applicable to the noise of utilities functioning under legislative authority was stated by Mr. Justice Blackburn
in a leading case, Hammersmith & City Ry. v. Brand:
"I think it is agreed ... that if a person, not authorized by
Act of Parliament so to do erected a railway or any other private
road on his land, and then worked it by running locomotives
and trains, or any other species of carriages, upon it, so that the
vibration and noise . . . [annoyed] a neighbour, that injury
would be a nuisance, and that neighbour would have a fresh
cause of action against the maintainer of the way every time that
the way was so worked . . . and he might . . . obtain an injunction. . . . But if, instead of making and maintaining a private way of his own, the owner of the land dedicated it as a
public highway, and . . . the noise and vibration seriously
affected the neighbours, I apprehend they would be without
88. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 555 (1914). See also United
States v. Willow River Power Co.,• 324 U.S. 499, 506, 510 (1945): "The uncompensated
damages sustained by this riparian owner on a public waterway are not different from
those often suffered without indemnification by owners abutting on public highways
by land."
89. Legal principles applicable to municipalities may sometimes differ from those
applicable to states. See, e.g., Town of Amherst v. Niagara Frontier Port Authority, 19
App. Div. 2d 107, 241 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1963), complaint dismissed for legal insuffidency,
40 Misc. 2d 116,242 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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remedy. The common law would leave them suffering a private
hardship for the public benefit." 90
The plaintiffs in Hammersmith had acquired their property before the railroad had been constructed. None of the plaintiffs'
property had been used in the construction, and there was no showing of negligence in the operation of the railroad. It was admitted
that the value of the plaintiffs' property had declined as a result of
the running of the trains. The specific question before the House of
Lords was whether the common-law rule had been altered by special
legislation enacted in 1845, by which compensation was to be paid
by railroads for "any lands taken or used for the purposes of the
railway, or injuriously affected by the construction thereof." 91 After
considering the purpose of the statute, the court denied the asserted
claim on the basis that the compensation provided by Parliament
was limited to damages occasioned by the construction of a railroad
and did not give "any remedy to the Plaintiffs for damage occasioned
to their house in the course of using the railway." 92
This House of Lords decision remains the law in England today
except to the extent modified by special acts of Parliament. Such an
act has been adopted for the regulation of civil aviation (the Civil
Aviation Act, 1949).93 This act provides that no action for trespass
or nuisance shall lie for normally conducted flights and no action
for nuisance shall lie for noise and vibration caused by aircraft at
airports, but it imposes absolute liability for "material loss or damage" caused to persons or property on land or water by an aircraft
in flight, taking off or landing.94 Government aircraft are exempt
90. Hammersmith&: City Ry. v. Brand, L.R. 4 HL. 171, 195-96 (1869).
91. Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 &: 9 Viet., c. 20, § 6. The pertinent
part of this section provides that "the company shall make to the owners and occupiers
of and all other parties interested in any lands taken or used for the purposes of the
railway, or injuriously affected by the construction thereof, full compensation for the
value of the lands so taken or used, and for all damage sustained by such owners,
occupiers, and other parties, by reason of the exercise, as regards such lands, of the
powers by this or the special Act, or any Act incorporated therewith, vested in the
company•.. .'' Also considered in the decision were the general provisions of the Lands
Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 &: 9 Viet., c. 18.
92. At p. 206 the headnote reads: "The Land Clauses Consolidation Act, and the
Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, do not contain any provisions under which a
person whose land has not been taken for the purposes of a railway, can recover
statutory compensation from the railway company in respect of damage or annoyance
arising from vibration occasioned (without negligence) by the passing of trains, after
the railway is brought into use, even though the value of the property has been
actually depreciated thereby."
93. 12 &: 13 Geo. 6, c. 67 (1949).
94. Id. §§ 40(1), 40(2) and 41(2). "'Material' loss or damage connotes, it is thought,
injury to persons or property which is of a physical nature;" 5 HAl.sBURY's LA.w OF
ENGLAND 246 n.k (1953).
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from the act unless the Queen, by Order in Council, shall apply
the act to such aircraft, 95 but no such Order in Council has
issued. Furthermore, the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947° 0 relieves
the government from any liability for torts of the armed forces (which
would include the operation of governmental aircraft) while training
or maintaining their efficiency.
Returning for a moment to the law of England as it relates to
noises other than those produced by aircraft, it will be observed that
the rule is the same as that stated by the Supreme Court in Richards
v. Washington Terminal. However, there is a difference between
the two regimes in another respect which bears directly on the discussion to follow. In England, compensation is payable to an abutting owner whose property has declined in value as the result of
losing a right of access to his property, or the stopping of a passageway used by him, or the narrowing of a road before his house. 07
Under the "taken" language of the federal constitution and of the
states, such an abutting neighbor is qrdinarily denied compensation.08
Section 41(2) provides: "No action shall lie in respect of nuisance by reason only
of the noise and vibration caused by aircraft on an aerodrome to which this subsection
applies by virtue of an Order in Council under section eight of this Act ..•• "
Pursuant to article 64 of the Air Navigation Order 1960, regulations have been issued
providing that noise and vibration may be caused at licensed aerodromes when "(a) the
aircraft is taking off or landing, or (b) the aircraft is moving on the ground or water,
or (c) the engines are being operated" to check their performance, to warm them
before flight or to insure the components of the aircraft are in satisfactory condition.
Regulation 10 of Air Navigation (General) Regulations, 1960.
Despite the annoyance caused by noise of jet aircraft at England's principal air•
port "the demand, as reflected in rents and prices, was at least as great for houses
close to the Airport as for those a few miles away.'' Report of the Committee on the
Problem of Noise, Final Report, Cmd. No. 2056 at 64 (1963). The report recommended,
however, that grants be made to cover a portion of the cost of soundproofing adjacent
homes, and this recommendation has been recently adopted for a maximum of £100
($280) per home. New York Times, March II, 1965, p. 65, col. 7.
95. Civil Aviation Act, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 67, § 61 (1949).
96. 10 & II Geo. 6, c. 44.
97. Under the 1845 Acts of Parliament referred to in note 91 supra, a distinction
was made between damage arising from authorized user for which no recovery was
allowed (Hammersmith v. Brand) and damage to an abutting owner directly resulting
from construction for which recovery was allowed. See, e.g., M'Carthy v. Metropolitan
Board of Works,• L.R. 7 C.P. 508 (1872); Beckett v. Midland Ry.,• L.R. 3 C.P. 82
(1867); East & West India Docks & B. Ry. v. Gattke,• 3 Mac. & G. 155 (1851); Cham•
berlain v. West End of London & C.P. Ry.,• 2 Best & Smith 605, 110 E.C.L.R. 604,
affirmed at 617 (1863). Compare Ricket v. Metropolitan Ry.,• L.R. 2 H.L. 175 (1867),
in which compensation was denied for a temporary interruption of access which sub•
stantially affected the business at plaintiff's hotel.
98. See Transportation Co. v. Chicago,• 99 U.S. 635 (1879).
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The State Constitutions

At the present time the state constitutions are of two types. Nearly
half of the states have constitutional provisions similar to the federal,
providing compensation for property "taken" for public use. The
other half provide compensation for property "taken or damaged,"
or contain other language with equivalent meaning.99
The manner in which these differences arose provides some assistance in interpreting the provisions themselves. Until 1870, the
federal language had been uniformly copied by the states. In 1870
Illinois made the change, the first state to do so.100 The impetus
for the change was the great increase in rail and municipal
highway construction following the end of the Civil War which
changed the contour of many American cities. Property owners adjacent to this new construction frequently found that the grading
had cut off their access to adjoining streets or that they had otherwise been adversely affected. The railroads and municipalities denied
liability on the basis that there had been no taking, and this position
was generally upheld by the courts. At the 1869 Illinois Constitutional Convention, it was urged that broader protection be afforded
property owners by adding the word "damaged" to the constitutional
provision for the purpose of providing the recovery available under
English law which "has been well settled."101
The first two cases decided by the Illinois Supreme Court under
the new language made it clear that the English rules were to be
followed and that there was no intention to permit recovery for
every conceivable type of property damage. In the first decision, the
Illinois court held that a property owner whose land was adjacent
to a street and who had lost his access to it as a result of municipal
construction could recover for the decline in value of his property.102
99. This latter group includes: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. In Alabama,
Kentucky and Pennsylvania the "damaged" language is limited to action by municipalities and public utilities with the power of eminent domain. North Carolina has no
state constitutional provision governing eminent domain, but property owners there are
protected by the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, as well as by
judicial interpretation of the state due process clause. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases
of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1931).
100. Prior to 1870 there had been some special state statutory provisions allowing
recovery in limited instances for property damaged, and it is not uncommon today for
a state with a federal type clause to make broader statutory provision for compensation
in connection with a specific construction project.
101. 2 lLUNOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS 1578 (1869-70).
102. Rigney v. City of Chicago,• 102 Ill. 64 (1882). This was a definite expansion
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The court relied upon the English rule that a lando·wner has a property interest in such access. 103 However, in the second case, which was
decided during the same term, the court refused to consider the claim
of a landowner whose business was located several blocks away from a
street which had been closed because under Illinois law (and the
law of England) an owner has no property interest in non-abutting
streets.104 The test applied by the court was not whether there had
been a decline in property values, which was claimed in both cases,
but whether the decline was due to an established property right that
had been destroyed. The first of these Illinois opinions contained the
following statement, which was repeated verbatim in the second:
"[T]o warrant a recovery it must appear there has been some
direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or private,
which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his property, and
which gives to it an additional value, and that by reason of
such disturbance he has sustained a special damage with respect
to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally. . . . [I]t was the intention of the framers of the present
constitution to require compensation to be made in all cases
where, but for some legislative enactment, an action would lie
by the common law." 105
Several other states, following the example of Illinois, changed
their constitutions to include the word "damaged" or its equivalent,106 and the constitutions of most of the states admitted to the
union after 1870 contained the broader terminology. An encyclopedic work would be needed to trace the history of the constitutional
provisions in each of the states, but I have been able to find nothing
to indicate any intention to allow a neighboring property ovmer to
recover for loss due to noise. 107
of the traditional rule, which denied compensation for loss of access unless part of the
plaintiff's property had been taken and the taking itself resulted in a loss of access.
Transportation Co. v. Chicago,• 99 U.S. 635 (1879). See discussion in Chicago v. Taylor,•
125 U.S. 161 (1888).
103. The English rule allowing recovery for loss of access by an abutting property
owner is stated in M'Carthy v. Metropolitan Board of Works,• L.R. 7 C.P. 508 (1872),
a case cited by Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra note 102. Rigney was not, strictly
speaking, an "abutting" property owner since his land was 220 feet from the street
closed, but nevertheless he had lost a valuable access right and was treated by the
Illinois court as though he were an abutting owner.
104. Chicago v. Union Bldg. Ass'n, • 102 Ill. 379 (1882), involving a suit for an
injunction. The English rule denying recovery to the non-abutting property owner is
stated in Ricket v. Metropolitan Ry.,• L.R. 2 H.L. 175, 198-99 (1867).
105. Rigney v. City of Chicago,• 102 Ill. 64, 81 (1882); Chicago v. Union Bldg.
Ass'n,• 102 Ill. 379, 394 (1882).
106. See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 6.44 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
107. The history of the Virginia amendment, for example, closely follows that of
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The changed language, it should be noted, did not say that compensation will be paid whenever a person has suffered damages, but
was confined to situations in which his property has been damaged.
The usual interpretation was that "damaging" was merely an extension of the idea of "taking." Thus "taking" was a physical process as
it applied to real property; a taking did not occur unless there was a
physical invasion of plaintiff's land. Similarly, "damaging" was also a
physical process; a damaging did not occur unless there was either
visible physical deterioration of plaintiff's land or loss of some right
pertaining to his land which could be physically demonstrated, such
as loss of access. 108 As already explained, this was also the pattern
worked out in England. When the courts said that the addition of the
word "damaged" was intended to restore the situation as it had existed under the common law, this is what was meant. 109
This conclusion is supported by the preponderance of opinion
among the states making the change that there is no right of recovery
for noise from public improvements, whether operated by the government or those acting under government authority. The point
appears to have been considered by twenty-two of the twenty-six
states which have constitutions containing the term "damaged" or
equivalent language. In fifteen of these states the courts adopted
the federal rule (and the common-law rule) expressed in Richards v.
Washington Terminal, that property owners adjacent to a right-ofway are required to bear without redress any depreciation in their
property due to the noise resulting from its use. 110 In the remaining
Illinois. VmGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 714-15 (1902).
In California, the change was made to permit recovery for loss of access. 3 CALIF. CoNsrITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1189-90 (1878-1879). Two of the members of the court in
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 13 Atl. 690 (1888), afj'd, 153 U.S. 380 (1894),
which denied recovery for noise, were Pennsylvania constitutional delegates.
108. See, e.g., Rigney v. City of Chicago,• 102 Ill. 64, 81 (1882) (there must be "some
direct physical disturbance of a right . • . which gives to it an additional value');
Church ,,. Railroad, 36 Utah 238, 247, 103 Pac. 243, 247 (1909) ("there must be some
physical interference with the property itself or with some easement which constitutes
an appurtenant thereto'). Compare Tidewater Ry. v. Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 59 S.E. 407
(1907). See Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221,
259-60 (1931), where it is suggested that the physical conception of "taking" should be
abandoned and recovery allowed for any violation of the "legal relations" of an
individual.
109. See, e.g., Rigney v. City of Chicago,• 102 Ill. 64 (1882); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 561, 13 Atl. 690 (1888), afj'd, 153 U.S. 380 (1894).
110. See McClung v. Louisville & N.R.R., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So. 2d 371 (1951); Arkansas
State Highway Comm'n v. McNeill, 381 S.W.2d 425 (Ark. 1964) (highway noise); Hot
Springs R.R. v. Williamson,• 45 Ark. 429 (1885), afj'd, 136 U.S. 121 (1890); People v.
Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451 (1960) (highway noise); Harrison v. Denver City
Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593, 131 Pac. 409 (1913); Austin v. Augusta Terminal R.R.,
108 Ga. 671, 34 S.E. 852 (1899); Louisville Ry. v. Foster, 108 Ky. 743, 57 S.W. 480 (1900);
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seven states having the term "damaged," there is a conflict in the
decisions within the individual states, but in six of the seven states
the more recent decisions indicate that noise is not compensable. 111
Finally, the few cases that have been found dealing with the loud
noises made by trucks and cars moving on modern high-speed expressways unanimously hold that there can be no recovery. 112
A clear statement of the predominant view appears in Bennett
v. Long Island R.R., 113 which, although arising in New York where
Chesapeake & O. Ry. v. Gross, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1926, 43 S.W. 203 (Ct. App. 1897):
Louisville &: S.R.R. v. Hooe, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 521, 38 S.W. 131 (1897); Matthias v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 125 Minn. 224, 146 N.W. 353 (1914); Romer v. St.
Paul City Ry., 75 Minn. 211, 77 N.W. 825 (1899); Dean v. Southern Ry., 112 Miss. 333,
73 So. 55 (1916); Randle v. Pacific R.R., 65 Mo. 325 (1877); Smith v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
50 Mont. 539, 148 Pac. 393 (1915); Gram Constr. Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M. Ry., 36 N.D. 164, 161 N.W. 732 (1916); Wunderlich v. Pennsylvania R.R., 223 Pa.
114, 72 Atl. 247 (1909); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marchant, supra note 109; Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472, 9 Atl. 871 (1887); Hyde v. Minnesota, D. &: P.R.R., 29
S.D. 220, 136 N.W. 92 (1912); Board of Educ. v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 697
(1962); Church v. Railroad, 36 Utah 238, 103 Pac. 243 (1909); Taylor v. Chicago, M. &:
St. P.R.R., 85 Wash. 592, 148 Pac. 887 (1915); DeKay v. North Yakima &: Valley Ry., 71
Wash. 648, 129 Pac. 574 (1913); Smith v. St. Paul, M. & M.R.R., 39 Wash. 355, 81 Pac.
840 (1905).
lll. Compare decisions following the majority view: Thompson v. Kimball, 165
F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1948) (construing law of Nebraska); Weiner v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
292 Ill. App. 303, 10 N.E.2d 981 (1937); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Trustees of School, 212
III. 406, 72 N.E. 39 (1904); Aldrich v. Metropolitan W. Side Elevated Ry., 195 III.
456, 63 N.E. 155 (1902); Metropolitan W. Side Elevated Ry. v. Goll, 100 Ill. App.
323 (1902); Britt v. City of Shreveport,• 83 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 1955); Oil Fields &:
Santa Fe R.R. v. Treese Cotton Co.,• 78 Okla. 25, 187 Pac. 201 (1920); St. Louis, S.F. &:
T. Ry. v. Shaw, 99 Tex. 559, 92 S.W. 30 (1906); City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 156 Va. 40,
157 S.E. 769 (1931); See Gardner v. Bailey,• 128 W. Va. 331, 36 S.E.2d 215 (1945)highway noise; with contrary views in the same state: Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Kuehle, 95 Ill.
App. 185 (1901); Chicago, P. &: St. L. Ry. v. Leah, 152 Ill. 249, 38 N.E. 556 (1894);
Chicago, M. &: St. P. Ry. v. Darke, 148 III. 226, 35 N.E. 750 (1893); Helmer v. Colorado,
So. N.O. & P.R.R., 122 La. 141, 47 So. 443 (1908); Kayser v. Chicago B. &: Q.R.R., 88
Neb. 343, 129 N.W. 554 (1911); Omaha&: N.P.R.R. v. Janecek, 30 Neb. 276, 46 N.W. 478
(1890); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Matthews, 174 Okla. 167, 49 P.2d 752 (1935);
Ft. Worth &: R.G.R.R. v. Downie, 82 Tex. 383, 17 S.W. 620 (1891); Gainsville, H. &:
W.R.R. v. Hall, 78 Tex. 169, 14 S.W. 259 (1890); Tidewater Ry. v. Shartzer, 107 Va.
562, 59 S.E. 407 (1907); Fox v. Baltimore&: O.R.R., 34 W. Va. 466, 12 S.E. 757 (1890).
In addition, in a few states it is held that although there can be no recovery for the
noise of passing trains, damages may be recovered for noise caused by railroad
shops on the theory that they could be placed anywhere by the railroad-perhaps
where it would annoy no one-and that the property owner required to bear the brunt
of the annoyance produced by such a facility should be compensated for such damages
as are not "common to the public at large." See, e.g., Matthias v. Minneapolis, St. P.
&: S. Ste. M. Ry., 125 Minn. 224, 146 N.W. 353 (1914). This is not, however, the accepted
rule in this country or in England. London, B. &: S.C. Ry. v. Truman, HL. 11 App. Cas.
45 (1885).
112. See Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. McNeil, 381 S.W.2d 426 (Ark. 1964);
People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451 (1960); See Gardner v. Bailey,• 128
W. Va. 331, 36 S.E.2d 215 (1945). See also Mathewson v. New York State Thruway
Authority, ll App. Div. 2d 782, 204 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1960), afj'd, 9 N.Y.2d 788, 174 N.E.2d
754 (1961).
113._ 181 N.Y. 431, 74 N.E. 418 (1905).
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the constitution follows the federal pattern, has been cited with approval a number of times by courts in states which have the broader
constitutional language: 114
"The rumble of trains, the clanging of bells, the shriek of
whistles, the blowing off of steam, the discordant squeak of
wheels in going around the curves, the emission of smoke, soot
and cinders, all of which accompany the operation of steam
cars, are undoubtedly nuisances to the neighboring dwellings in
the popular sense, but as they are necessarily incident to the
maintenance of the road, they do not constitute nuisances in
the legal sense, but are regarded as protected by the legislative
authority which created the corporation and legalized its corporate operations. Nor does the legal nature of such annoyances
change as traffic increases them in volume and extent." 115
As anyone knows who has heard the passage of a hundred-car freight
train, the railroad cases cannot be explained away as differing in
degree from the airway cases. The railway cases are characterized by
claims of cracked walls, broken windows, and interrupted sleep. 116 In
addition, the neighbors of railroads have been required to bear
smoke, smells, sparks and cinders. 117
Thus, in 1946 when the Supreme Court approached the issues
in Causby, it had available to it two established principles of law:
first, the rule that noise alone (absent negligence and the other
special exceptions discussed earlier) does not constitute a ground
for recovery under the federal constitution, the broadened state constitutions, the common law, or the statutory law of England; second,
the rule that invasion and exclusionary possession of the airspace of
a landowner does constitute an appropriation which requires the
payment of compensation. 118 In Causby the Supreme Court fitted an
114. See, e.g., Smith v. Northern Pac. Ry., 50 Mont. 539, 148 Pac. 393 (1915); Church
v. Railroad, 36 Utah 238, 103 Pac. 243 (1909); Taylor v. Chicago, M. &: S.P.R.R., 85
Wash. 592, 148 Pac. 887 (1915).
ll5. Bennett v. Long Island R.R., 181 N.Y. 431, 436-37, 74 N.E. 418, 420 (1905).
ll6. See, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 550 (1914); Taylor
v. Chicago, M. &: St. P.R.R., 85 Wash. 592, 594-97, 148 Pac. 887 (1915); cases cited in note
ll0 supra.
117. See cases cited notes 110 and 116 supra. The decisions also deny relief for
an increase in the level of noise over what was originally anticipated. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Kimball, 165 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1948); McClung v. Louisville &: N.R.R.,
255 Ala. 302, 51 So. 2d 371 (1951); Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593,
131 Pac. 409 (1913); Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Scomp, 124 Ky. 330, 98 S.W. 1024 (1907).
See also Staton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 147 N.C. 318, 61 S.E. 455 (1908).
118. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). See Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transport Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655 (1937),
where the court stated that in Portsmouth Harbor L. &: H. Co. v. United States,•
260 U.S 327 (1922), "the use or occupancy of the airspace, if it can be so considered, was
under such circumstances as amounted to a taking of the surface also." See also Butler
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airways noise case into the whole fabric of the law. I stress this because it would seem that the essence of Government under Law is a
pattern that provides some assurance of reasonable consistency of
treatment and not a patchwork derived from the whim of a Haroun
al Raschid dispensing a case-by-case brand of "justice" without
reference to any standard except his own.
D.

Two Recent State Court Decisions

And this brings us to the recent decisions of two state courts
involving aviation noises: Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 119 an
Oregon case decided in 1962, and Martin v. Port of Seattle, 120 a
Washington case decided in 1964. In Oregon the constitution follows the federal pattern; in Washington the constitution is in
the broadened form, containing the words "taken or damaged."
Despite the difference in constitutions, both of these states had
previously decided that damage from noise alone, in the absence
of negligence, did not constitute a compensable injury. 121 These
earlier decisions had involved railways. However, when the courts
of Oregon and Washington faced the issue of airway noise, the
earlier holdings were simply ignored. A four-to-three majority in
Oregon and a unanimous court in Washington held that the airway noise was a compensable injury. In each of the cases, persons who alleged that their property had been damaged by the noise
of aircraft not shown to have been negligently operated and which
did not pass over their property were held to have valid constitutional claims.
In Thornburg, the court decided that a "continuing and substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of property" is a taking,
and that the issue of whether it is substantial enough to permit recovery will be for the jury to determine. 122 Since the accepted definiv. Frontier Telephone Co.,• 186 N.Y. 486,491, 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1906): "The law regards
the empty space as if it were a solid, inseparable from the soil, and protects it from
hostile occupation accordingly."
119. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
120. 64 Wash. 2d 324,391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
121. See McQuaid v. Portland & V. Ry., 18 Ore. 237, 250, 22 Pac. 899, 904 (1889):
"(T]he adjoining lot owner •.. will, doubtless, be obliged to submit to the ordinary
inconvenience and consequences which the construction of a railroad track, and the
moving of a locomotive and cars thereon, occasion,-be compelled to endure the smoke,
noise and screeching which naturally result from the use of that character of vehicles;
but they cannot be deprived of the right of ingress and egress to and from their
premises, without compensation." For Washington cases, see note 110 sup,ra.
122. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 194-95, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). On
retrial, the jury found there had been no taking. Docket No. 245-004, Cir. Ct.
Multnomah «=:ounty, Feb. 17, 1964. An appeal has been entered.
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tion of nuisance is a "substantial" interference with "the use or enjoyment of land," 123 Thornburg would, by this approach, convert
every nuisance into a taking, a truly unique doctrine. 124 As the dissent pointed out, "Not a single Oregon case will support the theory
that a mere nuisance can be considered a taking, as provided in our
constitution, nor does any other jurisdiction where the language of
the constitution is similar to ours hold that a mere nuisance can be
considered a taking, nor does the majority cite any case so holding."125
The court in the Martin decision went even further. It decided
that the interference did not have to be substantial,126 and thus held
that constitutional protection is afforded against aviation noises
that are even below the level required for a nuisance. Indeed, the
Washington court rejects the nuisance concept127 and requires recovery "when the land of an individual is diminished in value for
the public benefit. . . ." 128 The court did not even mention its
earlier decisions dealing with railroads wherein it had flatly declared
that railroad noises which "depreciate the value of adjoining private
property" result in damage that "is purely consequential and is not
recoverable." 129
Since neither Thornburg nor Martin reconciles its holdings with
other decisions by the same courts, it is not possible to say what these
cases mean. Did the court in Martin literally mean that "When
the land of an individual is diminished in value for the public
benefit, then justice, and the constitution, require that the public
pay?" If that is the intent, damages may be recovered in Washington
for enacting building restrictions or zoning requirements, for converting a t\'lo-way street into a one-way street, for narrowing sidewalks, for constructing neighborhood fire or police stations, or even
123. See 4 REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 822 (1939).
124. For the origin of this fallacious standard, see note 67 supra.
125. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 207, 376 P.2d 100, 113-14 (1962).
However, the dissent suggests (p. 213) that under Oregon law the plaintiffs may have a
damage action against the municipality operating the airport "for the creation of a
nuisance for the benefit of the public," citing Wilson v. City of Portland,• 153 Ore.
679, 58 P.2d 257 (1936), which involved negligent dumping of garbage in a ravine.
126. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 540, 546-47 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
127. Although not mentioned in the decision, in ·washington "nothing which is
done or maintained under express authority of a statute, can be deemed a nuisance."
WASH REv. CooE § 7.48.160 (1952).
128. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 324, 391 P.2d 540, 547 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
129. Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 Pac. 377 (1921). See also Washington
cases cited in note 110 supra.
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for erecting a new lamppost, as well as for the noise of highways,
railways and ainvays. And we may ask with reasonable curiosity if
only land is to be protected by this new rule or whether personal
property, which is also covered by the constitution, must be paid
for when it has been "diminished in value for public benefit?" When
a new bus franchise is authorized in the interest of public convenience and necessity, is compensation to be paid to the other
holders of bus franchises and to the competitive rail and airlines who
can show a decline in value of their licenses?
If only a small fraction of this is intended to be protected, the
principle of socializing losses has been carried by the Washington
court beyond anything previously known under American or English law. 130 But is that what is meant? It would not seem unreasonable
to expect a court that makes such a drastic change in its constitutional
concepts to have said so plainly. That was not done in Martin. As to
its real meaning, not a clue is given-not a single case dealing with
any subject other than aviation is mentioned throughout the entire
opinion. Whether the court intended to make a separate rule for
aviation but hesitated to say so because of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, 131 or whether it intended to change
its constitutional standards, will presumably remain a mystery until
the decision is tested in subsequent litigation in other causes. 132
SUMMARY

In summarizing the subject of noise caused by the government
or by government authorized utilities, I offer these conclusions:
First, Richards v. Washington Terminal still represents the federal law. A nuisance resulting from noise made by the government
130. Compare Note, 30 J. Am L. & CoMM. 287, 291 (1964): "[T]he Supreme Court
•.. is most likely to follow the lead of the Washington court ..• overruling Batten in
the process."
131. Although the Supreme Omrt has rejected previous contentions that the equal
protection clause was violated by allegedly inconsistent judicial opinions, the cases in
which the issue was raised suggest that some logical distinction between the opinions
was drawn by the courts or was apparent on the face of the opinions. See, e.g.,
Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380 (1894), holding that equal protection of
the laws under the fourteenth amendment was not denied by the distinction drawn by
the Pennsylvania courts between a property owner damaged by loss of access (to whom
compensation was granted) and a property owner damaged by noise (to whom compensation was denied). Compare Beck v. Washington,• 369 U.S. 541, 554-55 and
dissenting opinion at 568 (1962), also involving a decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington.
132. The petition of the Port of Seattle to the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari [denied 379 U.S. 989 (1965)] did not make the equal protection
argument.

June 1965]

Noise and the Law

1407

or by an entity operating pursuant to government authority does
not constitute a taking even when it causes a decline in the value
of neighboring property. Whether the noise emanates from a railroad, an express highway, an airway, or from a fire engine house
makes no difference. To the extent the noise is a necessary incident
of an activity sanctioned by law and is free from negligence, there
is no right to recover damages.
Second, the preceding paragraph represents the federal rule;
it is also the common-law rule and would appear to be the correct
interpretation of the state constitutions which follow the federal
pattern. 133 The word "taken" as used in the state constitutions, and
as used in the ancestors of those constitutions, was not intended to
provide recovery of damages for noise.
Third, it has not been possible to examine in full the purpose
that each of the individual states may have had when they incorporated the term "damaged" into their constitutions. To the extent this purpose has been discussed in the decisions of those states
and in the few constitutional debates that have been referred to, there
appears to have been no intention of providing compensation for
the damage that may be caused by noise.134 And surely an interpretation of a statute or constitution must be applied equally to
all persons coming before the courts. When this is not done, as for
example in Thornburg and Martin, the result must be condemned
as a grave abuse of judicial power.
Obviously it cannot be contended that a court may not correct
an erroneous interpretation once it has been shown to be erroneous.
Neither can it be contended that constitutional provisions should
be regarded as inflexible regardless of changes in economic and
social conditions.135 However, in the aviation cases it is apparent
that no new legal problems have been created by changes in economic and social conditions. The legal problems are exactly the
same as they have always been: where is the line to be drawn between compensable and noncompensable damage, and who is to
draw it?
133. "[I]t was the common law of England, and consequently of this country, when
the constitutions were adopted, that if a private owner suffered necessary damage
from a public improvement, but his land was not actually entered on or taken, it
was damnum absque injuria." 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.38[1] (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
134. See Wofford, The Blinding Light-The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502 (1964).
135. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainright: The "Art" of Overruling, SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 211, 219·29 (1963).
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"Where is the line to be drawn? If property owners on Filbert street may recover, why not those on Arch street, and Race,
and so on north and south, east and west, as far as the whistle
of the locomotive can be heard, and its smoke can be carried?
The injury is the same, it differs only in degree. And it does not
stop here. The constitution does not apply to railroads merely.
It affects all corporations clothed with the power of eminent
domain, including cities, boroughs, counties, and townships; it
is applicable to canals, turnpikes, and other country roads. If, by
judicial construction, we extend the constitution to all the
possibilities resulting from the lawful operation of a public
work; to all kinds of speculative and uncertain consequential
injures [sic], we shall find ourselves at sea, without chart or
compass to guide us." 136
In deciding where the line is to be drawn, consideration should
be given to a number of subjects-the first that come to mind are
the fairness of one line compared with another as it affects the
individuals on whom the loss first falls and the cost to the government of socializing the loss. However, additional considerations are
the ease of applying the rule, the importance of avoiding multiplicity
of suits, and the ability of property owners and their lawyers to
know when and how the rule applies. The common-law concept of
physical invasion which was embodied in our constitutions is probably the easiest to apply of all possible choices, assuming that compensation is to be granted at all. The extended controversy over
this relatively simple standard illustrates what would happen if a
standard like that suggested by Martin were adopted.
What is clear is that the line has to be drawn somewhere, and
wherever it is drawn there will be some who will argue persuasively
that this results in injustice:
"[A] tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking where you are going to
draw the line, and an advocate of more experience will show
the arbitrariness of the line proposed by putting cases very near
to it on one side or the other. But the theory of the law is that
such lines exist, because the theory of the law as to any possible
conduct is that it is either lawful or unlawful. As that difference
has no gradation about it, when applied to shades of conduct
that are very near each other, it has an arbitrary look." 137
136. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 558-59, 13 Atl. 690, 696 (1888),
afj'd, 153 U.S. 380 (1894). Pennsylvania had previously added the "and damaged"
language.
137. This is a statement by Mr. Justice Holmes, but I can no longer remember
the source. Similar statements by him appear in Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman,•
277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928), and Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 44 HARv. L. REv. 773, 775
(1931).
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Where the line is to be drawn is considerably harder to answer
than who should draw it. Here, it would seem that the line had
already been drawn, and that it is only for the courts to determine
whether particular cases fall on one side or the other. But even if
that were not the case and the problem was solely one of what
the rule should be, one might think that courts would be especially
reluctant to embark on a novel course in a field involving so many
considerations requiring the type of broad factual investigation and
analysis characteristic of the legislative rather than the judicial
function. The judicial expansion of constitutional language through
interpretation is familiar enough, but we must not forget that this
is largely either an effort to find a way to carry out the will of the
people as expressed through the legislature or an attempt to accommodate a new social or economic fact within the framework of old
words of general purport. 138 A court cannot lawfully expand the constitution simply because it disagrees with what the constitution says.
"Of course we know full well that law must be administered
by men, and that human judgment is an inevitable element in
the application of law. But it is one thing to act according to
one's personal predilections or choice, and a wholly different
thing to come to one's own best conclusion in the light of his
understanding of the law as it has been established by statute,
decision, tradition, received ideals and standards, and all the
other elements that go to make up our legal system." 139
Fourth and finally, the one point on which courts appear agreed,
regardless of the form of constitution, is that an injunction will not
issue to restrain the government or a government-authorized entity
from an activity which creates noise 140 so long as it is a necessary inci138. See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv.
673 (1963).
139. Griswold, 0/ Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HA.Ilv.
L. REv. 81, 92 (1960). See also Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REV. 735, 754
(1949); and Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 749, 773 (1965).
140. See, e.g., Railroads: Osborne 8: Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 147 U.S. 248 (1893);
McClung v. Louisville 8: N.R.R., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So. 2d 371 (1951); Stetson v. Chicago
8e E.R.R., 75 Ill. 74 (1874). Pipelines, water and power companies: Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952); Hillside Water Co. v. Los
Angeles,• 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681 (1938); Gurnsey v. Northern Cal. Power Co.,• 160
Cal. 699, 117 Pac. 906 (1911). Construction of public airports: Jasper v. Sawyer, 3 Av.
Cas. 18118 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Warren Township v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 19
N.W.2d 134 (1944): State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op. 58,
79 N.E.2d 698 (1947), appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911 (1948): Atkinson
v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Operation from public airports:
Smithdeal v. American Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Tex. 1948); Loma Portal
Civil Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
City of Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P.2d 609 (1953); Brooks v. Patterson, 159
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dent of an activity sanctioned by law and is not negligently conducted.141 The courts will often give other reasons for withholding
relief, but the result is that an injunction is regularly denied under
these circumstances. If the courts were to adopt any other course, it
would constitute an unreasonable interference with legislative
authority.
A great service would be rendered potential litigants if the
courts in all jurisdictions, federal and state, regardless of the constitutional language, would make the reason for their action clear.
Because of the apparent reluctance of courts to state the proposition
plainly, the point is constantly being relitigated. 142 It should be
unequivocally laid to rest.
So far as I am aware, this is the first attempt to draw together,
on a broad scale, the cases dealing with the scope of the immunity
of the government and government-authorized entities from legal
action for objectionable noises or other nuisances. While I have
been led at times to assert with a fair degree of positiveness what
the law is or what the law should be, the article is cheerfully offered
as a starting point for comment and criticism in this extremely
interesting and difficult field.
Fla. 263, 31 So. 2d 472 (1947); Bourland v. City of San Antonio, 347 S."W.2d 660 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961). Operation from military airport: Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp.
287 (D. Md. 1962). Sonic boom tests: Coxsey v. Halaby, 231 F. Supp. 9i8 (\V'.D. Okla.
1964). A possible exception is Dlugas v. United Airlines Trans. Corp., 53 Pa. D. &: C.
402 (C.P. 1944), in which an airline was enjoined from operating flights below one
hundred feet not to exceed ten days a year in order to permit plaintiff's land to be
farmed. The scope of the injunction in Dlugas is described in Anderson v. Souza, 38
Cal. 2d 825, 243 P .2d 497 (1952).
In states requiring compensation to be paid before a taking, an injunction may issue
if this procedure has not been followed. See, e.g., Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western
Ry., 28 Utah 201, 77 Pac. 849 (1904).
141. See, e.g., Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati,• 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d
557 (1962) (municipality enjoined from condemning property of another municipality).
Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. Buffalo,• 246 App. Div. 472, 284 N.Y.S. 598
(1936), modified, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d 10 (1937) (city enjoined from improper
discharge of sewage). Pennsylvania R.R. v. Angel, 41 N.J. Eq. 316, 7 Atl. 432 (1886)
(railroad enjoined from ultra vires operation of switchyard in front of plaintiff's
house). See note 64 supra.
142. Consider, for example, the waste in two recent cases where this point was
involved: Mathewson v. New York State Thruway Authority, 22 Misc. 2d 410, 196
N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afj'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 782, 204 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1960), afj'd,
9 N.Y.2d 788, 174 N.E.2d 754 (1961) (action to enjoin night operations of trucks on
New York thruway); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 259763,
San Diego, Cal., Super. Ct., July 5, 1962, reversed, 37 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. 1964),
rehearing denied, March 31, 1964, trial court's denial of injunction affirmed, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964), petition for rehearing denied, Sept. 11, 1964
(action to enjoin low flights at San Diego municipal airport).

